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THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR
OSHA INSPECTIONS: UPHOLDING BUSINESS
OWNER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS-
MARSHALL V. BARLOW'S, INC.
A current government survey indicates that each year over five million
Americans are either injured while employed or afflicted with occupational
diseases. The actual figure may be as high as ten million.1 The economic
impact of such occupational maladies is overwhelming, particularly since
they are considered to be largely preventable. 2
In response to the growing concern for occupational safety and health,
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).3
The stated purpose of the Act was "to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to
preserve our human resources. . .. "4 In an effort to ensure effective en-
forcement of the regulations promulgated under OSHA, Congress adopted
section 8(a) 5 which provides for warrantless surprise inspections. 6 How-
l. Ingersoll, It's Your Job or Your Life, Chicago Sun-Times, June 18, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
2. The cost to society for workplace deaths, injuries, and illnesses is $8 billion a year. 123
CONG. REC. H164 (daily ed. January 6, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§651-78 (1970) (hereinafter
cited as OSHA].
OSHA's legislative history began on May 16, 1969, when Senators Williams (D-N.J.), Ken-
nedy (D-Mass.), Mondale (D-Minn.), and Yarborough (D-Texas) introduced S. 2193. 115 CONG.
REC. 12855 (1969). The bill passed the Senate on November 17, 1970, 116 CONG. REC. 37632
(1970), and was brought to the House floor by unanimous consent on November 24, 1970, as
H.R. 16785. 116 CONG. REC. 38724 (1970). A modification of the bill, H.R. 19200, was intro-
duced by Congressmen Steiger and Sikes. This bill described the workplace with more particu-
larity and required that an inspector's entry into a workplace be permitted "without delay." 116
CONG. REC. 31875 (1970). H.R. 19200 was adopted by the House as an amendment to S. 2193.
116 CONG. REC. 38715, 38724, & 38733 (1970). After both the Senate and House agreed to the
conference report (H. Rep. 91-1765), 116 CONG. REC. 41753, 41965, & 42199 (1970), the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was finally approved on December 29, 1970, as Pub. L.
No. 91-596. 116 CONG. REC. 44064 (1970). See also White, OSHA 1-26 to 1-32 (II1. Inst. For
Cont. Legal Educ., 1974).
4. 29 U.S.C. §651(b)(1970).
5. Id. §657(a) (1970). This section of the Act provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this Chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establish-
ment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is
performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reason-
able times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place
of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, de-
vices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such
employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.
6. The legislative history surrounding §8(a) is scant. Section 9(a) of the original H.R. 16785
authorized the Secretary of Labor to enter, inspect and investigate any pertinent conditions or
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ever, section 8(a), promulgated to secure factual information needed by
OSHA to assure a safe and healthful working environment, 7 has come in
conflict with certain privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.8  Various district courts have tried to resolve the conflict between
these competing interests and have reached inconsistent conclusions. 9
equipment for health and safety violations. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1970). This section was amended by H.R. 19200 and became §8(a) of the final Act. H.R. REP.
No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 36 (1970). The author of the amendment reminded the
House that inspections would have to be conducted in accordance with applicable constitutional
protections. 116 CONG. REC. 38709 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Steiger). The minority views on the
House version of the bill pointed out that searches conducted without a warrant are a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 55(1970).
7. To exercise its substantial power, OSHA needs to acquire information within the area of
its authority. OSHA's enforcement procedures are a vital means to obtain needed information to
insure compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Warrantless inspections pro-
vide the maximum of administrative efficiency. The author of the Act stated: "[Ilt is important
to note that warrantless civil inspections are both absolutely essential to this Act's enforcement
and a longstanding Federal practice." 123 CONG. REC. H163 (daily ed. January 6, 1977) (re-
marks of Rep. Steiger).
8. As agencies grow and their regulations correspondingly intensify, it is probable that
many refinements of Fourth Amendment rights will result from cases involving searches by
administrative compliance officials rather than police officers. A partial list of administrative
standards with which the American businessman must comply include those which regulate air
and water pollution, quality of food, sale of securities, safety of modes of transportation, labor
practices, and advertising as well as occupational health and safety. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TEXT 3 (3d ed. 1972).
9. In upholding the constitutionality of §8(a), the Georgia district court, in Brennan v.
Buckeye Indus. Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Ga. 1974), stated that the federal government has
broad regulatory powers including the right to authorize unannounced inspections in response
to compelling administrative needs. The court also pointed out that existing provisions of the
Act amply protect a business owner's privacy interests. This court construed Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), narrowly.
In Camara, a housing code provision permitting warrantless inspections of residential prop-
erty was held to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, in See, a fire code provi-
sion authorizing warrantless inspections of commercial premises was held to be a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The court viewed United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), and
Colonnade Catering Co. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), as broad retreats from the insis-
tence on strict Fourth Amendment standards. Biswell held that warrantless inspections pursuant
to the Gun Control Act were reasonable and not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Simi-
larly, Colonnade Catering Co. held that a warrantless administrative entry pursuant to a provi-
sion of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service was not a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. Some commentators feel, however, that the Buckeye Industries
case can best be explained by the fact that the district court could not consider subsequent
Supreme Court decisions that relied heavily on a broad interpretation of the Camara and See
decisions. See Note, OSHA Inspections and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing Private Rights
and Public Need, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 112 (1977); Note, The Constitutionality of War-
rantless OSHA Inspections, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1214, 1221 (1977).
The district court in Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (1976), held that
§8(a) authorized OSHA inspections only when accompanied by a search warrant based upon
probable cause standards appropriate to administrative searches. The court felt that "the Fourth
Amendment is not to be viewed as in a condition of general retreat before an administrative
advance." Id. at 161. Therefore, the statute was construed in a manner consistent with the
[Vol. 28:105
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This controversy over the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to sec-
tion 8(a) of OSHA was recently resolved by the United States Supreme
Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 10 This Note will analyze the Court's
treatment of Mr. Barlow's Fourth Amendment claim to be free from unwar-
ranted government intrusion. Attention will be directed toward the factors
applied by the Court when determining the reasonableness of a business
owner's expectation of privacy. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the
Court's redefinition of the probable cause standard in light of OSHA's com-
pelling enforcement needs. In addition, comments will be made regarding
the possible effect of the Marshall holding upon other regulatory schemes.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Pursuant to section 8(a) of OSHA, an Occupational Health and Com-
pliance Officer properly identified himself" and requested permission to
conduct a safety and health inspection of Barlow's, Inc. 12 The inspection
was part of a random routine selection process of the agency and was not
made in response to a specific complaint by an employee. 13 In the absence
of a search warrant, Mr. Ferrol G. "Bill" Barlow, president and general
manager of Barlow's, Inc., refused to allow the inspection, relying on his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Sec-
retary of Labor, after petitioning the district court of Idaho, obtained an
Fourth Amendment. If Congress could intend nothing beyond its constitutional powers, the
court felt the requirement of a search warrant for restricted inspections was presumed and not
explicitly made a part of the statute. The court construed Camara and See broadly, while Col-
onnade and Biswell were thought to be narrow exceptions based upon an implied consent to
unwarranted inspections. See Note, Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless OSHA Searches
-Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 156 (1976).
Other lower court decisions concerning OSHA inspections include: Accu-Namics, Inc. v.
OSHA Review Comm'n, 515 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975) (employer's Fourth Amendment rights
not violated when a compliance officer did not immediately show his credentials upon arriving
at the scene of a construction accident); Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975) (routine inspection of a clothing manufacturer's plant held consensual for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment in that the plant president accompanied the compliance
officer); Marshall v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (probable cause
to issue a warrant for inspection of a metal-working industry based upon a showing of congres-
sional purpose together with the nature of the business); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc.,
418 F. Supp. 627 (D. N.M. 1976) (OSHA can conduct a non-consensual inspection of an
employer's premises only pursuant to a search warrant based upon probable cause sufficient to
justify an administrative search).
10. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
11. The inspector's right to enter a premises is conditioned upon the presentation of ap-
propriate credentials. 29 U.S.C. §657(a)(1) (1970). At least one court has stated that if the
employer wishes, he may make a phone call to verify the inspector's authority. Usery v. God-
frey Brake & Supply Service, Inc., 545 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1976).
12. Barlow's Inc. is an electrical and plumbing installation business located in Pocatello,
Idaho. 98 S. Ct. at 1819.
13. For a discussion of OSHA's inspection scheme see note 101 and accompanying text in-
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order compelling entry, inspection and investigation of the premises.' 4
When this order was presented to Mr. Barlow, he again refused to allow the
inspection and filed an action to enjoin enforcement of the inspection provi-
sions of OSHA. 15
A three-judge district court 16 found the section 8(a) enforcement provi-
sion, authorizing warrantless inspections of business establishments, 17 to be
a violation of the Fourth Amendment1 8 stating that "except in certain care-
fully defined classes of cases, the search of private property without proper
consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant."19 On appeal,20 the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-3 deci-
sion, 2 l affirmed the district court's holding and declared section 8(a) of
OSHA an unconstitutional intrusion upon Mr. Barlow's Fourth Amendment
rights.
14. Ifan inspection is refused, 29 C. F. R. § 1903.4 (1977) provides that:
The Compliance Safety and Health Officer shall endeavor to ascertain the reason for
such refusal, and he shall immediately report the refusal and the reason therefor to
the Area Director. The Area Director shall immediately consult with the Assistant
Regional Director and the Regional Solicitor, who shall promptly take appropriate
action, including compulsory process, if necessary.
15. The district court issued a permanent injunction restraining the government from engag-
ing in further warrantless inspections of nonpublic portions of commercial premises. The United
States Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, then sought a Supreme Court
order limiting the effect of the decision to Barlow's premises. Justice Rehnquist granted the
government's request, noting that the district court decision had invalidated part of an Act of
Congress. Justice Rehnquist took the position that OSHA enforcement should remain in effect
pending a final decision on the merits. Thus, OSHA inspections continued until the Supreme
Court decided the constitutional issue. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347 (1977).
16. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976).
17. The court extended the warrant protection to include administrative inspection of com-
mercial property. Id. at 440 citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
18. The district court in Idaho also addressed itself to two legal issues. First, the court held
that it should not dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that
Mr. Barlow did not exhaust his administrative remedies. It reasoned that the issue presented in
this case was constitutional and outside the expertise of the administrative agency. Second, the
court order authorizing the inspection reserved the constitutional issue. Therefore, Barlow's
failure to appeal the order did not bar his Fourth Amendment claim on res judicata grounds.
19. 424 F. Supp. 437, 440 (D. Idaho 1976) citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528-29 (1967).
20. Direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a three-judge district court opinion is pro-
vided for in 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1970) as a matter of right. See also Radio Corp. of America v.
United States, 95 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ill. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 412 (1951). The statute applies
to injunction suits involving the constitutionality of a federal act. This section should be nar-
rowly construed in view of the overriding policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of the
Supreme Court in the interests of sound judicial administration. Gonzalez v. Automatic
Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98 (1974).
21. Justice White wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell. Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion joined by Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
[Vol. 28:105
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ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
In holding section 8(a) warrantless inspections to be a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court considered and rejected the following argu-
ments as presented by the Secretary of Labor: (1) OSHA inspections involve
pervasively regulated businesses and therefore are not subject to the warrant
requirement; 22 (2) all businesses involved in interstate commerce are subject
to close government supervision; therefore, inspections of such businesses
are exempt from the warrant requirement; 23 (3) a business owner does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning commercial property; 24
(4) OSHA's administrative efficiency requires warrantless inspections; 25 and
(5) requiring a search warrant would have adverse effects upon regulatory
schemes similar to OSHA. 26
The Secretary alleged that OSHA inspections fall within recognized excep-
tions to the warrant requirement for pervasively regulated businesses and for
those regulated industries long subject to close supervision and inspec-
tion.2 7 Owners of such regulated businesses are deemed to have impliedly
consented to inspections and, therefore, have no reasonable expectation of
privacy from intrusions by regulatory agencies. 28 The Court, however, re-
jected this contention. 2 9 Ordinary businesses, such as Barlow's, Inc., were
distinguished from pervasively regulated businesses because they lack a
"long tradition of close government supervision." 3 0
The Court also rejected the suggestion that Barlow's business was part of a
closely regulated industry subject to lawful warrantless inspections because
his operations were not necessarily confined to the state of Idaho.31 Mr.
Barlow was held not to have impliedly consented to the search simply be-
cause his business had some effect on interstate commerce. 32  In that re-
22. 98 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
23. Id. at 1821.
24. Id. at 1820.
25. Id. at 1822.
26. Id. at 1825.
27. Id. at 1820-21. The Supreme Court delineated the exception for "pervasively regulated
business[es]" in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), and "closely regulated"
industries "long subject to close supervision and inspection" in Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
28. 98 S. Ct. at 1821.
29. Id. The Supreme Court construed these exceptions narrowly based upon the unique
circumstances presented in each case.
30. Id.
31. Similarly, the fact that the Walsh-Healy Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. §§35-45 (1970), imposes a
minimum wage and maximum hour on all employees of businesses contracting with the gov-
ernment does not mean that these businesses are under close government regulation. 98 S. Ct.
at 1821.
32. Id. The Supreme Court disregarded the fact that §2 of OSHA states that Congress,
through the exercise of its power to regulate commerce among the several states, enacted this
legislation to alleviate the substantial burdens placed upon interstate commerce "in terms of lost
production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments." 29 U.S.C.
§651(a) (1970).
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gard, the Court stated that "under current practice and law, few businesses
can be conducted without having some effect on interstate commerce." 33
It was further held that Mr. Barlow's expectations of privacy within his
commercial premises were reasonable. 34 The Court, however, distinguished
between observations made by employees and those of government inspec-
tors. 35 Employee observations, within the scope of employment, were held
to be beyond the owner's reasonable expectation of privacy. Government
inspectors without search warrants, though, were considered to stand in no
better position than members of the public. 36
The Secretary of Labor urged the Court to consider the crucial administra-
tive necessities of OSHA inspections in light of the minimal protection a
warrant could afford the business owner's privacy interests. 37 Stressing the
unique administrative considerations presented in this case, the Secretary
contended that warrantless inspections were essential to the proper en-
forcement of the statute. 38 The warrant requirement, he argued, would de-
stroy the element of surprise needed to insure that employers would have
no opportunity to hide or alter unsafe working conditions.
39
The Supreme Court resolved this issue by suggesting that ex parte war-
rants 40 would neither seriously burden OSHA or the courts nor prevent
33. 98 S. Ct. at 1821.
34. Id. at 1820.
35. Id. at 1821-22.
36. Id. at 1821. What is observable to the public is observable by the government official
without a warrant. See generally Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
37. An inspection warrant purports to serve the following three functions: (1) to inform the
employer that the inspection is authorized by statute; (2) to advise him of the lawful limits of
the inspection; and (3) to assure him that the inspector is authorized personnel. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1830 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) citing Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). In examining these functions in the OSHA context, Justice
Stevens felt that existing protections within the Act adequately protected Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 1830-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority felt, however, that the requirement of a search warrant would protect a business
owner's rights in two ways. First, a search warrant issued for OSHA inspections would replace
the discretion of an administrative field officer with a neutral magistrate's assurance that the
inspection is reasonable and pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral
criteria. Second, the warrant would perform the important function of advising the owner of the
scope and objects of the search. Id. at 1826.
38. Id. at 1822.
39. See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
40. A judicial proceeding is said to be ex parte when it is granted for the benefit of only one
party. The person adversely interested is given no notice of the proceedings. BLACK'S LAW
DiCTIoNARY 662 (4th ed. 1968).
One commentator feels that the ex parte warrant proceeding is far less a safeguard than an
adversarial process. It is suggested that a better procedure would be to allow the affected indi-
vidual representation during the warrant procedure so that any constitutional claims can be
raised at that time. This advance judicial determination of Fourth Amendment rights would
afford the business owner the most protection. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 31 [hereinafter cited as Ad-
ministrative Searches].
[Vol. 28:105
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effective inspections necessary to enforce the statute. The advantage of sur-
prise, the Court noted, would not be lost if an ex parte warrant were issued
and the inspector permitted to reappear at the premises without further
notice. The Court also felt that the great majority of businessmen would
continue to consent to warrantless inspections. However, in cases where the
business owner refused inspection, an ex parte warrant procedure would be
no more burdensome than the Secretary's own provision for refusals. 4 1
Finally, the Court also rejected the notion that requiring a search warrant
for OSHA inspections would jeopardize the constitutionality of other reg-
ulatory statutes which provide for warrantless searches. The reasonableness
of such other provisions would depend upon their specific enforcement
needs and the privacy guarantees. 42
Another important aspect of the decision is the redefinition of probable
cause in the context of an OSHA inspection. For the purpose of OSHA's
administrative searches, a warrant could be issued based on specific evi-
dence of an existing violation or on a showing that "reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular establishment." 43 Recognizing the distinction be-
tween administrative inspections and criminal investigations, the Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment does not require that probable cause be
defined in the criminal law sense.
PROTECTION OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
In determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment's 44 protection with
respect to OSHA's warrantless inspections, the Marshall Court focused
41. 29 C.F.R. §1903.4 (1977). See note 14 supra for the text of this provision. The Supreme
Court felt that this provision represented a choice to proceed by process where entry is refused.
Since the Act does not require such a provision, the Marshall Court reasoned that if the effi-
cient administration of OSHA was endangered by this safeguard, the Secretary should never
have adopted or retained it. 98 S. Ct. at 1823-24.
42. Id. at 1825. The Marshall Court added that it based its opinion "on the facts and law
concerned with OSHA and [did not] retreat from a holding appropriate to that statute because
of its real or imagined effect on other, different administrative schemes." Id.
43. Id. at 1824. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
44. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the right of the people to be secure against
the arbitrary invasion of their privacy by the government. Drafted as a reaction to the abuses of
the general warrant in England, and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, the Amendment
protects privacy interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and by requiring
that search warrants be based upon probable cause. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977). Today, the Fourth Amendment, viewed as a right which is basic to a free society, is a
vital remedy and safeguard against unwarranted government intrusion. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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primarily on the business owner's reasonable expectations of privacy, a con-
cept developed in Katz v. United States.45  Before Katz, the focus of Fourth
Amendment protection was on whether the location searched could be
characterized as a constitutionally protected area. 46 This emphasis on loca-
tion was replaced in Katz by an examination of the individual's expectation of
privacy at the location of the search.4 7 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Katz 48 further refined this shift by outlining a two-fold requirement for
determining such protected rights. First, a person must exhibit an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation of privacy must be
one that society will recognize as "reasonable." 49 Thus, the final determina-
tion of whether to protect an individual's privacy interests should be based
upon the reasonableness of that person's expectations. 50
In determining the reasonableness of a business owner's expectation of
privacy with respect to section 8(a) of OSHA's regulatory scheme, the Su-
preme Court in Marshall considered the following analytic dichotomies: (1)
private vs. commercial premises, 5 1 (2) public vs. nonpublic areas, 52 (3)
employees vs. government officials, 5 3 and (4) pervasively regulated and
supervised industries vs. nonregulated industries. 54
The Amendment's protective umbrella has been modified and expanded over the years to
meet the needs and circumstances of a changing society, evolving to encompass a comprehen-
sive variety of privacy interests. These privacy interests are found in homes as well as telephone
booths, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); hotel rooms, United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951); and offices, Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
Of immediate concern is the degree of protection afforded to commercial privacy interests,
which are infringed upon by federal agency regulations such as OSHA. See Note, OSHA v. the
Fourth Amendment: Should Search Warrants Be Required for "Spot Check" Inspections?, 29
BAYLOR L. REv. 283 (1977); Comment, The Validity of Warrantless Searches under the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 44 CIN. L. REv. 105 (1975); Note, OSHA Inspections
and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing Private Rights and Public Need, 6 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
101 (1977).
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, a telephone conversation was obtained by attaching an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth. This gov-
ernment action was considered to be a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment; thus, a valid search warrant was required.
46. Id. at 350-51. The Supreme Court has described its conclusions in terms of "constitu-
tionally protected areas" in the following decisions: Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59
(1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961).
47. The Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967).
48. Id. at 360.
49. Id. at 361.
50. For example, a person's home is a place where privacy is expected and protected. How-
ever, objects, activities or statements that a person willingly exposes to the public exhibit no
intention of privacy. They are not protected because expectation of privacy under the cir-
cumstances is unreasonable. Id.
51. 98 S. Ct. at 1820.
52. Id. at 1821-22.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1820-21.
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Private vs. Commercial Premises
With little analysis, the Marshall Court stated that Mr. Barlow had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his commercial as well as private prem-
ises. 55  In so holding, the Court relied upon See v. City of Seattle.56 The
See Court, in an opinion equally sparse in analysis, supported its holding by
referring to prior decisions which required an administrative subpoena for
inspection of corporate books and records. 57 Instead of citing See, the Mar-
shall Court could have applied the two-fold test presented by Justice Harlan
in Katz 5 8 to more definitively explain its holding.
A business owner obviously exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy in
a commercial premises in that he or she does not wish to expose to the
public the maintenance and operation of the commercial enterprise. Thus,
because an expectation of this nature is objectively reasonable as well, the
business owner would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. A
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to
go about his business free from warrantless government intrusion upon his
commercial property. 59 Therefore, regardless of which analysis is used, the
Marshall decision illustrates that the Supreme Court is continuing to uphold
the principle that the Constitution does not provide a separate or lower
standard of Fourth Amendment protection for commercial premises. 60
Public vs. Nonpublic Areas
The Marshall Court narrowed the area where an owner could reasonably
expect to be free from warrantless intrusions to include only the "nonpublic
areas" of the commercial premises. 61 This limits the importance of the indi-
vidual's intent, thereby deviating from the basic Fourth Amendment
rationale. According to Katz, what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
either within the home or the office, is not subject to protection. What an
individual seeks to preserve as private, however, even in an area accessable
55. Id. at 1820.
56. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
57. 387 U.S. 541, 544-45. The Court reiterated in See that the Fourth Amendment requires
that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive
so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. See United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
58. For a discussion of the test formulated by Justice Harlan in this case see note 48 and
accompanying text supra.
59. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
60. See United States v. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969) (a warrantless search of an
unoccupied office was an unreasonable search); United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir.
1968) (warrantless electronic eavesdropping in a government office was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment); City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 298 F. Supp. 706 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (a warrant-
less search of a store and seizure of magazines by police officers violated Fourth Amendment
rights; therefore, the store owner was entitled to a temporary injunction).
61. 98 S. Ct. at 1821-22.
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to the public, may under certain circumstances be constitutionally pro-
tected. 62
Although the Court does not resolve this apparent anomaly, there are two
possible explanations. First, using Justice Harlan's two-fold standard from
Katz, 6 3 even though Mr. Barlow had an expectation of privacy within the
public area of his commercial property, this expectation of privacy was not
reasonable. Although this explanation is probably accurate, 64 the Marshall
Court's limitation could also suggest a return to the pre-Katz locational
analysis. 65  Such an analysis, however, would be contradictory to the consis-
tent application of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to private
as well as commercial premises.66
A pre-Katz location analysis would seem to suggest that public areas of
commercial premises are not constitutionally protected, regardless of the ex-
pectation of privacy concerning those locations. This approach would initiate
a different constitutional standard to be applied when commercial property is
involved. 67  Such an inconsistency should be avoided. Since the Marshall
Court did not directly address this issue, it remains for subsequent decisions
62. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). If the Marshall Court strictly fol-
lowed the Katz principle, Mr. Barlow's privacy within the public area of his commercial prem-
ises should also be protected if he had a subjective intent of privacy in that location.
63. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
64. The Marshall Court could have assumed that the Fourth Amendment guaranty against
unwarranted government intrusion did not apply to a public place; therefore, the majority did
not discuss this concept in the opinion. The "plain view" and the abandoned property doctrines
support this theory. It is well settled that objects in plain view of an officer are subject to
seizure and may be introduced in evidence. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). See
United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1971) (a remark overheard by agents stationed in
a public place near the door of an apartment was admissible as evidence); Nunez v. United
States, 370 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1967) (officers standing on public property looking into a car
window did not violate the Fourth Amendment); People v. Wright, 41 Ill.2d 170, 242 N.E.2d
180 (1968) (officers looking into the window of a dwelling from public property were not in
violation of the Fourth Amendment), It is also permissible for officers to search for and seize
property which is abandoned, as long as the abandonment was not caused by illegal police
conduct. See United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953
(1963) (a warrantless search of garbage cans located on the premises but outside the building is
not unreasonable). Accord United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971).
65. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
66. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
67. The Supreme Court, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977)
citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) stated: "[tihe Court, of course, has recognized that a business, by its
special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be permis-
sible in a purely private context." Id. at 353. See also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946) (a warrantless arrest of a filling station attendant and seizure of ration coupons was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment in that less strict requirements of reasonableness apply to a
business premises); Peeples v. United States, 341 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1965) (the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is less stringent where federal
officers search for public documents to verify a tax stamp within the regulated business of retail
liquor).
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to clarify whether the Court actually intends to return to a careful examina-
tion of location when determining Fourth Amendment rights within com-
mercial premises. Regardless of which approach is taken in the future,
emphasis on a unified constitutional standard to commercial premises is im-
perative to insure predictability for the business community and for the
agencies regulating those businesses.
Employees vs. Government Officials
In limiting a business owner's reasonable expectation of privacy, the Mar-
shall Court distinguished between observations made by employees as com-
pared with those of government officials. What an employee observes in the
nonpublic areas of the premises is beyond the employer's reasonable privacy
expectations. 68 Employees occupy the nonpublic areas of a commercial
premises for a considerable period of time during each work day, and the
business owner voluntarily consents to this occupation.
Although the Court appears to be limiting a business owner's reasonable
expectation of privacy by using a consent theory, the need for administrative
efficiency would also provide justification for this position. Since employees
are in the best position to notice and report occupational health and safety
hazards, the effective operation of OSHA depends upon voluntary employee
complaints. 69  The Marshall Court seems to acknowledge this necessity by
encouraging employees to report occupational health and safety hazards
without the burdensome procedural impediment of obtaining a search war-
rant.
Pervasively Regulated and Closely Supervised
Industries vs. Nonregulated Industries
The Marshall Court also considered a business owner's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in light of the type of business being regulated by the
government agency. 70 The Court has recognized two specific exceptions
71
68. 98 S. Ct. at 1821. The Marshall Court appropriately did not consider government in-
spectors to be within the employee category. Without a search warrant or consent of the owner,
a government official cannot legally inspect the nonpublic areas of the premises. The fact that an
employee is free to report, and the government is free to use, what the employee sees and
experiences within nonpublic areas does not preclude the owner from a reasonable expectation
of privacy from government intrusion. Id. at 1822.
69. 29 C.F.R. §1903.11(a) (1977) provides that "[a]ny employee or representative of
employees who believe that a violation of the Act exists in any workplace where such employee
is employed may request an inspection of such workplace by giving notice of the alleged viola-
tion to the Area Director or to a Compliance Safety and Health Officer.
70. 98 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
71. It also appears that the Marshall Court considers warrantless regulatory inspections
reasonable only when a regulatory statute is aimed -at a specific industry. Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1833 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In adopting this rational, the Court
appears to be focusing on the specific nature of the enforcement scheme, and requiring that all
warrantless inspection provisions be narrowly defined, such as those provisions which concern
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to the warrant requirement in regulatory inspections: (1) closely regulated
industries long subject to close supervision and inspection,7 2 and (2) perva-
sively regulated businesses. 73  Both exceptions were founded upon an im-
plied consent theory. 74  Even though the Marshall Court acknowledged that
a business owner consents to inspections pursuant to enforcement regula-
tions simply by engaging in a pervasively or closely regulated industry, 75 it
refused to apply similar reasoning to OSHA inspections. The fact that all
types of industries are subject to OSHA regulations was not sufficient to
establish consent to OSHA's inspections. 76
The analysis used by Justice Stevens in his dissent presents a more en-
lightening discussion of this issue. 77  An industry's long tradition of govern-
only liquor, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and firearms deal-
ers, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Presumably, the Supreme Court did not
uphold OSHA 's warrantless inspections because OSHA regulations are directed at numerous
health and safety hazards in all commercial work places. The underlying purpose, however, for
OSHA and liquor and gun control inspection provisions are similar. OSHA inspections apply to
virtually every industry, as occupational health and safety hazards occur in all businesses. In
contrast, gun and liquor inspections are confined to dealers in those items because virtually no
other industry handles the products. The scope of the federal agency's regulations in each case
is determined by the location of possible violations. Thus, the pertinent question is "not
whether the inspection program is authorized by a regulatory statute directed at a single indus-
try," but "whether Congress has limited the exercise of the inspection power to those commer-
cial premises where the evils at which the statute is directed are to be found." Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1833 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U.S., 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In upholding the warrantless
inspection provision pursuant to Alcohol and Tobacco Tax regulations, the Colonnade Court
commented upon the long history of liquor regulation predating the Fourth Amendment, both
in England and the American colonies. Id. at 75. Supported by this historical precedent, Con-
gress has broad powers to design inspection procedures under the liquor laws that are necessary
to meet what was considered "the evil at hand." Id. at 76.
73. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). In this case, the Court upheld a warrant-
less inspection pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968 on three grounds. First, the firearms
industry was pervasively regulated by federal, state and local laws. Id. at 315. Second, the
Court felt that effective inspections must be unannounced. Finally, the Biswell Court, relying
on the "implied consent theory," stated that a dealer who chooses to engage in a pervasively
regulated industry consents to government inspections. Therefore, the threat to the dealer's
justifiable expectation of privacy is minimal. Id. at 316.
74. It is well established that an exception to the warrant requirement based upon probable
cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 628, 630 (1946). Officers may lawfully search the premises with the voluntary permission of
the owner or person rightfully in possession of the property. United States v. Novick, 450 F.2d
1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Cutting v. United States, 169 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1948). See also J. ISRAEL
& W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 143-155 (2d ed. 1975).
75. 98 S. Ct. at 1821. See, e.g., notes 72 and 73 supra.
76. In reality, however, consent to either regulatory inspection is a legal fiction. No busi-
ness owner, simply by engaging in an industry, whether pervasively regulated or not, actually
consents to warrantless government searches. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1833
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. It must be noted, however, that by adopting Stevens' position, the result in the case
would be changed.
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ment regulation does not imply consent to enforcement provisions or negate
any reasonable expectation of privacy.78 As Justice Stevens noted, the
longevity of a regulatory program should have no bearing on the constitu-
tionality of its routine inspections. 79  It is Congress, not the judiciary, which
should determine the types of businesses to be regulated, the extent of the
regulation, and the enforcement provisions needed to ensure compliance. As
society's needs and concerns change, new regulatory schemes are enacted
and applied to various industries. 80 These new regulations should carry the
same presumption of constitutional validity as do the older schemes.8 1 Simi-
larly, although OSHA was enacted only eight years ago, Congress deter-
mined that routine warrantless inspections were necessary. Thus, they
should be just as valid as similar provisions in older schemes.
REDEFINITION OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD
The majority in Marshall articulated a less demanding criterion for the
issuance of a search warrant in the context of OSHA inspections. This stan-
dard was first defined in Camara v. Municipal Court 82 as "reasonable legis-
lative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection . . .with
respect to a particular dwelling." 8 3 The crucial factor was considered to be
the "reasonableness" of the legislative and administrative standards that ac-
complish the government's goals . 8 4
In adopting the Camara standard, the Marshall Court stated that OSHA
inspection warrants need not be based on probable cause to believe that
violations exist on a particular premises,8 5 but instead may be based on
reasonable legislative or administrative standards. Therefore, a specific busi-
ness can be chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administra-
tive plan for the enforcement of the Act if it can be shown that the overall
78. 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1833 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. The dissent correctly pointed out that "'Congress' conception of what constitutes urgent
federal interests need not remain static." Id.
81. The Supreme Court in Biswell even admitted that the regulation of firearms did not
have as long a history of government control as the liquor industry; however, Congress had the
right to enact appropriate enforcement procedures in response to both urgent federal interests.
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,315 (1972).
82. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
83. Id. at 538.
84. The Camara Court pointed out that the ultimate standard is still "reasonableness." Id.
at 539. The Court suggested that the need to search be balanced against the invasion of privacy
that the search entails on a case by case basis. Id. at 536-37. The Court examined three relevant
factors in determining the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections: (1) the pro-
gram's long history of judicial and public acceptance; (2) public interests demanding that all
dangerous conditions be prevented or abated; and (3) the relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizen's privacy since the inspection does not seek evidence of a crime and is not di-
rected toward the resident's person. Id. at 537.
85. 98 S. Ct. at 1824.
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plan was derived from neutral sources. Two possible neutral sources were
suggested: (1) the dispersion of employees in various types of industries
across a given area; or (2) the desired frequency of searches in any of the
lesser divisions of the area. 86
Although the Marshall Court did not feel it necessary to elaborate on
these neutral criteria,8 7 they could encompass the following common situa-
tions: (1) industries with a high injury/illness rate that employ a large
number of workers; 88 and (2) a predetermined number of inspections of less
dangerous industries that employ fewer workers, or industries which operate
on a cyclical basis with inactivity for several months of the year.8 9 Although
the existence of neutral sources was emphasized in order to limit the previ-
ously unbridled discretion of administrative or inspection officers, 90 it ap-
pears that the Court intentionally framed the suggested sources in vague
language so the agency could continue to develop its own determinations in
light of crucial administrative needs.
Administrative Concerns
This redefined probable cause standard could be considered a compromise
to accommodate certain of OSHA's compelling administrative concerns.
First, warrantless inspections were considered essential to the proper en-
forcement of OSHA because they preserve the advantages of surprise. 9 1
Second, it was contended that a warrant requirement would place an exces-
sive burden on OSHA's personnel and financial resources. 92 Finally, there
was concern that a search warrant based upon a strict probable cause stan-
dard would delay or actually eliminate one of the four OSHA inspection
categories.9 3  Upon careful analysis, it can be concluded that the flexible
probable cause solution proposed by the Marshall Court will destroy the
surprise element and exacerbate OSHA's present economic and personnel
burdens, but will preserve existing inspection categories.
The element of surprise will be preserved only if the warrant is obtained
in advance. If the inspection official seeks a search warrant after being re-
fused entry, it is obvious that the initial surprise of a routine inspection is
86. id. at 1825.
87. The next area of litigation will probably be a further refining of the probable cause
standard in OSHA cases. 8 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP. 4 (June 1, 1978).
88. This example resembles the Fatality/Catastrophe Investigations category outlined by
OSHA's priority system. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Chapter IV, at IV-1 (Amended
March 29, 1978) [hereinafter cited as FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL].
89. This example resembles the Regional Programmed Inspections category of OSHA's
priority system. Id. at IV-2.
90. 98 S. Ct. at 1825-26.
91. Id. at 1822.
92. Id.
93. See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
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lost.9 4  Even though the inspection official can reappear without notice, the
business owner has the benefit of a period of time 9 5 to remedy or conceal 
96
violations. However, unlike the strict probable cause standard, the flexible
standard will make it easier to obtain advance warrants.
9 7
Despite the fact that a flexible probable cause standard will allow a quick
and uncomplicated warrant procedure, the warrant requirement alone will
create financial and personnel burdens for the agency. Currently, the Act
covers nearly 65 million workers engaged in their respective labor in approx-
imately five million workplaces. Previously most employers willingly con-
sented to inspections without a warrant. With this cooperation, the Secretary
has conducted more than 80,000 inspections yearly with only 1,300 inspec-
tors.98 It is not unreasonable to conclude that the rate of denied entries will
increase because business owners may now demand a search warrant.99 The
94. By refusing to directly address this issue, the Marshall Court seems to indicate that it is
acceptable for a business owner to use this time to remedy any violations of which he is aware.
It is likely that structural defects and other violations that are not quickly hidden or remedied
will not escape the issuance of citations. In all probability, however, the easily concealed viola-
tions will escape the inspector's notice. It is not clear whether the Marshall Court felt that
critical violations could not be easily concealed or that employees would report any substantial
violations to the agency. Nevertheless, the Court did not provide for the problem of easily
concealed violations that accompany advance notice of inspections.
95. The Marshall court points out that the Secretary's own provision for refusal to permit or
complete an inspection, 29 C.F.R. §1903.4 (1977), also affords the business owner a period of
time for delay. See note 14 supra.
96. The Court indicated that "[wihile the dangerous conditions outlawed by the Act include
structural defects that cannot be quickly hidden or remedied, the Act also regulates a myriad of
safety details that may be amenable to speedy alteration or disguise." 98 S. Ct. at 1822.
97. See Administrative Searches, supra note 40, at 20-27; McAdams & Miljus, OSHA and
Warrantless Inspections, 1978 LAB. L. J. 49, 58; Note, Warrantless Nonconsensual Searches
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 93, 110 (1977).
98. Brief for Appellant at 40, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., No. 76-1143 (D. Idaho May 23,
1978).
99. The Marshall Court felt that the great majority of business owners would consent to
inspections without warrants; therefore, burden on the agency would not be significant. 98 S.
Ct. at 1822. The Court itself, however, pointed out the weakness of this statement. This deci-
sion might itself have an impact on whether owners choose to resist requested searches. The
Supreme Court can only wait for future developments to determine how serious an impediment
to effective enforcement this might be. Id. at n.ll.
However, studies indicate that denials will increase. Inspection programs authorizing war-
rantless searches have a low rate of denials. "Figures from the Baltimore Health Department
show that while 157,914 [mandatory] inspections were conducted in 1954 through 1958, pros-
ecutions for refusal to admit a health inspector were estimated to average one a year." Adminis-
trative Searches, supra note 40, at 3 n.5. On the other hand, approximately one householder
out of six refused inspection under the Portland Oregon voluntary home inspection program.
Roughly the same rate of refusal was experienced under a voluntary Home Fire Safety Program
in San Francisco. Id. at 3 n.9.
In addition, as business owners refuse inspection, their competitors will also be forced to
refuse or face the added safety costs other industries can easily prolong by requiring a search
warrant. 123 CONG. REC. H164 (daily ed. January 6, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
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increased costs generated by futile trips to inspection sites where entry is
denied would eventually necessitate the costly practice of obtaining a search
warrant in advance. 100
Although administrative burdens will increase, the flexible probable cause
standard will allow OSHA to continue to conduct inspections based upon its
current priority system. 1° 1 Under this system, first priority is investigations
of imminent danger. Next, efforts are directed toward investigations of
fatalities or catastrophes. Then, priority is given to inspections of valid
employee complaints. Final priority is regional programmed inspections. 102
Without this flexible probable cause standard, regional programmed inspec-
tions, which by definition are not based ol the belief that violations exist at
a particular location, would be jeopardized. ' 0 3
The adoption of the flexible probable cause standard can also be inter-
preted as the Supreme Court's recognition of and support for the important
social interests embodied in the Act. American workers deserve protection
from unsafe and unhealthy working conditions afforded by the Act. Recogniz-
ing that the Act could not accomplish this purpose if warrants could be is-
sued only upon the showing of strict probable cause, the Court sought to
establish a flexible standard that would allow the agency continued effective
operation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has formulated a constitutional standard that de-
lineates a business owner's Fourth Amendment rights within administrative
enforcement schemes. Although the decision deals specifically with section
8(a) of OSHA, a0 4 the factors presented can arguably be applied to numerous
federal regulatory statutes that provide for similar warrantless inspections of
business premises. 105
100. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1829 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accord-
ing to OSHA, "there currently is no plan ... to obtain warrants before an inspection is made
. .8 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP. 3 (June 1, 1978). However, if OSHA does
not obtain the expected cooperation from business owners, it is probable that an advance war-
rant procedure will be necessary.
101. FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 88, at chapter IV. For the Act's original prior-
ity system see Health, The Implementation and Philosophy of the Williams-Steiger Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 249, 254 (1973).
102. FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 88, at chapter IV.
103. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1827 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Routine
OSHA inspections are analogous to regional programmed inspections.
104. Id. at 1825.
105. Similar or identical provisions are included in many federal statutes. See, e.g.. 7 U.S.C.
§136(g) (Supp. V 1976) (Environmental Pesticide Control Act); 7 U.S.C. §2146(a) (1976) (Animal
Welfare Act of 1970); 8 U.S.C. §1225(a) (1976) (Immigration and Nationality Act); 15 U.S.C.
§1270 (1976) (inspection of any factory or warehouse for "hazardous substances" by Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare); 15 U.S.C. §1401(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, §11, 90 Stat.
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It is most likely that the United States Supreme Court will continue to
use the reasonable expectation of privacy concept in determining protected
Fourth Amendment rights within commercial locations. However, it is un-
likely that Fourth Amendment protection will be extended to the entire
commercial premises or to everyone within those premises. Instead, various
limitations will be imposed upon the expectation of privacy standard based
upon the specific needs of each statute and the degree of infringement on
Fourth Amendment rights. 1 0 6
One important factor which must be examined in future cases is the par-
ticular administrative problems posed by the warrant requirement. The im-
portance of unannounced random inspections along with concern for in-
creased financial and personnel burdens that accompany a warrant require-
ment are not unique to OSHA inspections. 10 7  In response to these con-
cerns, it is likely that the Supreme Court will again resort to the flexible
probable cause standard as a compromise between the divergent interests.
By varying the probable cause standard, a delicate balance can be struck
between protected rights and effective administrative enforcement.
It should be remembered that in criminal cases, courts will not balance
divergent interests. Instead a showing of strict probable cause has tradition-
ally been required before a warrant could be issued. By deviating from this
traditional Fourth Amendment requirement, therefore, the Court has pro-
vided administrative agencies with the opportunity to exercise control over
the accomplishment of their objectives through the formulation of standards
2003 (1976); 21 U.S.C. §603 (1976) (Secretary of Agriculture's inspection of meat and meat
products); 21 U.S.C. §1034(a), (b), (d) (1976) (Egg Products Inspection Act); I.R.C. §5146(b);
I.R.C. §7606; 29 U.S.C. §211(a) (1976) (Fair Labor Standards Act) 30 U.S.C. §723, 724 (1976)
(Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act); 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976) (Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act); 33 U.S.C. §467(a) (Supp. V 1975) (Water Pollution Control Act); 41 U.S.C. §38 (1970)
(Walsh-Healey Act); 41 U.S.C. §53 (1970) (Anti-Kickback Act); 42 U.S.C. §262(c) (1970) (Public
Health Service Act); 42 U.S.C. §263(i) (1970) (Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act); 42
U.S.C. §1857c-9 (1970) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §1857f-6 (1970) (Air Pollution Control Act);
42 U.S.C. §2035(c), 2051 (1970) (Atomic Energy Act); 42 U.S.C. §5413(a) and (b) (Supp. V 1975)
(National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, §3007, 90 Stat. 2810 (1976); 45 U.S.C. §437(c)
(Supp. V 1975) (Railroad Safety Act); 46 U.S.C. §369(a) (1975) (Bureau of Marine Inspection
Act); 46 U.S.C. §408 (1970) (Coast Guard inspection of vessel boiler plates at manufacturer's
plant); 49 U.S.C. §1425(b) (1970) (Federal Aviation Act); 49 U.S.C. §§1677(a)(3), 1681(b) (1970)
(Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act); 49 U.S.C. §1808(c) (Supp. V 1975) (Transportation Safety Act
of 1974). See Brief for Appellants at 49, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., No. 76-1143 (D. Idaho May
23, 1978).
106. 98 S. Ct. at 1825.
107. The author of the Act stated, "OSHA inspections do not depart in any degree from
American custom. Identical provisions for warrantless civil inspections of business premises have
been commonplace for at least 70 years since passage of the Railroad Safety Appliance Act of
1908 .. " 123 CONG. REC. H163 (daily ed. January 6, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
For example, "the efficacy of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act depends upon the Food and
Drug Administration's ability to make unannounced random inspections." Brief for Appellant at
47, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., No. 76-1143 (D. Idaho May 23, 1978).
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based upon the agency's own statistical and technical criteria. A magistrate,
utilizing such standards in an ex parte warrant procedure, need not reformu-
late administrative enforcement plans, but need only review the administra-
tive plan proposed to determine whether it is based upon neutral
criteria.108 Thus, even though OSHA must obtain a warrant, the agency
will maintain ultimate control over inspection procedures. ' 0 9
Susan J. Schroeder
108. The dissent felt that the only "question for the magistrate's consideration is whether the
contemplated inspection deviates from an inspection schedule drawn up by higher-level agency
officials." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1830 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
also Administrative Searches, supra note 40, at 23-27.
109. At least one commentator feels that this circumstance breeds the risk that the warrant
procedure will become a rubber-stamp process. Because inspection warrants may be issued
upon general facts and upon request of an administrative specialist, it seems even more likely
that magisterial control will become a fiction in such cases. Administrative Searches, supra note
40, at 27.
